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424B4
IQIYI, INC. filed this Form 424B4 on 03/29/2018
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If our collaboration with Baidu is terminated or curtailed, or if we are no longer able to benefit from the synergies of our business cooperation with Baidu, our business may be adversely affected.

Our controlling shareholder and strategic partner, Baidu, is one of the largest internet companies in China. Our business has benefited significantly from Baidu’s advanced technological capabilities and strong market position in China. In addition, we have benefited from Baidu’s financial support in the past. We cooperate with Baidu in a number of areas, including AI technology, cloud services and traffic. However, we cannot assure you that we will continue to maintain our cooperative relationships with Baidu and its affiliates in the future. To the extent we cannot maintain our cooperative relationships with Baidu at reasonable prices or at all, we will need to source other business partners to provide services, which could result in material and adverse effects to our business and results of operations. We may also need to obtain financing through other means if Baidu ceases to provide financial support to us. In addition, our current customers and content partners may react negatively to our carve-out from Baidu. Our inability to maintain a cooperative relationship with Baidu could materially and adversely affect our business, growth and prospects.

Baidu will control the outcome of shareholder actions in our company.

Immediately upon completion of this offering, Baidu will hold 58.5% of our outstanding ordinary shares, representing 93.3% of our total voting power, assuming the underwriters do not exercise their option to purchase additional ADSs. Baidu has advised us that it does not anticipate disposing of its voting control in us in the near future. Baidu’s voting power gives it the power to control certain actions that require shareholder approval under Cayman Islands law, our memorandum and articles of association and Nasdaq Global Market requirements, including approval of mergers and other business combinations, changes to our memorandum and articles of association, the number of shares available for issuance under any share incentive plans, and the issuance of significant amounts of our ordinary shares in private placements.

Baidu’s voting control may cause transactions to occur that might not be beneficial to you as a holder of ADSs and may prevent transactions that could have been beneficial to you. For example, Baidu’s voting control may prevent a transaction involving a change of control of us, including transactions in which you as a holder of our ADSs might otherwise receive a premium for your securities over the then-current market price. In addition, Baidu is not prohibited from selling a controlling interest in us to a third party and may do so without your approval and without providing for a purchase of your ADSs. In addition, the significant concentration of share ownership may adversely affect the trading price of the ADSs due to investors’ perception that conflicts of interest may exist or arise. See “—We may have conflicts of interest with Baidu and, because of Baidu’s controlling ownership interest in our company, we may not be able to resolve such conflicts on terms favorable to us.”

We are a “controlled company” within the meaning of the Nasdaq Stock Market Rules and, as a result, will rely on exemptions from certain corporate governance requirements that provide protection to shareholders of other companies.

We are a “controlled company” as defined under the Nasdaq Stock Market Rules because Baidu beneficially owns more than 50% of our total voting power. For so long as we remain a controlled company under that definition, we are permitted to elect to rely, and will rely, on certain exemptions from corporate governance rules, including:

 

    an exemption from the rule that a majority of our board of directors must be independent directors;

 

    an exemption from the rule that the compensation of our chief executive officer must be determined or recommended solely by independent directors; and

 

    an exemption from the rule that our director nominees must be selected or recommended solely by independent directors.

 

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